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I study the human capital development and firm-worker matching processes for PhD economists. This
group is useful for this purpose because the types of jobs they hold can be easily categorized and they
have an observable productivity measure (that is, publications.) I derive a two-period model to motivate
an empirical analysis of economist job matching upon graduation, matching ten years later, and productivity
in the first ten years. I show that matching to a higher ranked institution affects productivity. I present
evidence that employers improve their estimates of economists' ability early in their career in a way
that determines longer-term job placement. I also find that the initial placement of economists to institutions
does not show much evidence of systematic misallocation along observable characteristics.
Paul Oyer
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Figure 1: Economist Job Sector Mobility. Institution ratings based on “econphd.net”.
“Ranked” includes tenure track jobs at ranked universities and all jobs at ranked non—universities.
“Non-Missing” includes anyone whose position is known.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Matching the right workers to the right ﬁrms presents one of the largest opportunities to create
surplus in employment relationships and in the economy more generally. For decades, labor econo-
mists have studied the theory of job market matching (see, for example, Jovanovic (1979)) and its
empirical ramiﬁcations (see Farber (1999) for a discussion of many relevant studies.) But, while
a select group of economists studies the job matching process, all economists engage in the job
matching process at various points. This begins with the rite of passage of “going on the market”
in the fall of the last year in graduate school and continues as economists consider, or actually
make, job changes throughout their careers. In this paper, I use the economist labor market to
study the economics of labor markets. I focus on how economists are matched to employers when
they enter the labor market and after ten years of experience. I consider the implications for the
job matching process and human capital development.
Figures 1 and 2 establish some facts about economist mobility and motivate the analysis. In
both ﬁgures (and throughout the paper), I use institutional rankings from econphd.net to divide
economist jobs into six sectors — tenure track jobs at Top 10 universities, at Top 25 universities, at
Top 50 universities, at other ranked institutions, any known job, and, ﬁnally, missing information.
Figure 1 shows how the sample that I use is divided among these sectors over the ﬁrst ten years
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Figure 2: Sector Mobility Conditional on Initial Placement at Top26-50 School.
Sample limited to economists whose ﬁrst placement is a tenure-track job at a school that ranks
between 26 and 50, according to econphd.net.
move to less prestigious institutions over the ﬁrst decade of their careers. For example, 23.3% of
the sample initially works in a tenure-track position at a Top 25 university. But, after ten years,
only 16.6% of the sample works at a Top 25 school. The graph shows that this tendency to move
“down” is consistent across all of these sectors.
While the average person moves down, a large fraction stay in the same sector or move up
during these years. This can be seen in Figure 2, which focuses on economists that start their
careers at universities ranked between #26 and #50 by econphd.net. After ten years, 35% of these
economists are still at schools in this category and 15% have moved up to Top 25 schools while
approximately half have either moved to an institution that is ranked below the Top 50 schools, to
an unranked institution or business, or somewhere that I was not able to ﬁnd them.
What drives these movements over the ﬁrst ten years? I begin by deriving a stylized two-
period model of careers where economists and employers match twice based on expectations about
economists’ research productivity. Expected productivity is a function of innate ability and human
capital developed in school and on-the-job. In the model, higher-ranked employers want to employ
the highest ability economists and help these economists generate more human capital. The three
key endogenous variables in the model are job placement upon graduation, “second-period” job
placement (which I deﬁne as job held ten years after leaving school), and “ﬁrst-period” (that is,
ﬁrst ten years) research productivity.
Using a dataset of the careers of economics PhDs from seven graduate schools, I analyze these
2three outcomes and address four issues. First, I analyze the degree to which initial job sector
aﬀects early career productivity. I show that economists that work at higher ranked institutions
are more productive than other economists, both because of selection and on-the-job human capital
development. Second, I investigate how updated expectations about economists’ ability during the
ﬁrst career period aﬀects second period placement. That is, I analyze the employer learning process.
The empirical results suggest that employers use productivity, and possibly unobserved factors that
are correlated with productivity, to match economists with appropriate positions. Third, I show
that the tendency to move “down” suggested by Figure 1 is a signiﬁcant and consistent pattern in
economist careers. I do not attempt to explain this pattern, leaving it as an avenue for potentially
fruitful research into optimal organizational design. Finally, I ask whether employers of economists
systematically make “mistakes” when hiring new economists by looking for correlations between
observable characteristics and movement among sectors early in economist careers. Though I
uncover no gross systematic errors, I do ﬁnd suggestive evidence that individual employers could
hire economists of higher average ability if they hired counter-cyclically.
These results should be of interest to economists and employers of economists for obvious
reasons. But I hope they make a contribution to the literature on job matching and employer
learning in the general economy. As is common in the Industrial Organization literature, focusing
on a single market segment has some substantial advantages. First of all, the institutional details
of this market are well understood in the economics community, potentially making it easier to
impose certain assumptions in the theoretical and empirical analyses. Second, economist jobs
are relatively easily observed and categorized. Third, research productivity provides a publicly
observable performance measure. Though I focus on economists, many of these same features are
found in other high skill professions where general human capital is important and individual’s
accomplishments are relatively easily observed.1
This paper adds to a long line of papers that model employees as having a person-speciﬁc
ability parameter that is a suﬃcient statistic for productivity. In these models, it takes some time
for employers to ﬁgure out a person’s ability. Therefore, at any given moment, pay may not reﬂect
ability. Farber and Gibbons (1996) investigate this issue and show that, as early careers develop,
dynamic patterns in pay suggest that employers are learning individuals’ ability (that is, they
are inferring things that are unobservable when the person enters the labor market.) Altonji and
Pierret (2001) provide further evidence on the importance of employer learning by showing that,
1For example, see Oyer (2006b) for an analysis of another group of high-skill workers — Stanford MBAs. In that
paper, I use a panel dataset of jobs held and wages, but I have no performance information. I show that people
w h og oi n t oi n v e s t m e n tb a n k i n gq u i c k l yd e v e l o ps p e c i ﬁc human capital. This leads to long-term attachment to the
industry and large income diﬀerentials.
3as a person’s career develops and employers observe better signals of “ability”, the coeﬃcients on
initially observable variables (such as education) decline in wage regressions and the coeﬃcients
on things learned over time (such as results of standardized tests) go up. They argue that this
provides evidence of statistical discrimination in initial wages. Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent
(2005) also look at learning, skill development, and sector mobility early in workers’ careers. They
look at wages and sector assignment. They ﬁnd that high-wage sectors attract high-skill workers
and give them relatively large opportunities for skill development.
I build a model that is similar, in many ways, to these prior studies. However, I focus on a
smaller and more homogeneous labor market. Also, Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret
(2001), and Gibbons et al. (2005) look at how pay develops over time and generally assume that
pay reﬂects productivity. Relative to these studies, I have the disadvantage of not having pay data
and the advantage of access to a direct measure of productivity (speciﬁcally, research output.) I
draw inferences about employee learning and human capital development based on the types of
jobs people hold and their productivity..
This paper also adds to a long literature on the labor market for economists and is most closely
related to two papers in that literature. Oyer (2006a) shows that getting a “good” initial position
after ﬁnishing an economics PhD program leads an economist to be more likely to hold a “good”
job later and to be more productive in terms of research. In the current paper, I analyze other
factors that predict success along these same dimensions. I also explicitly model and analyze
the value of employers’ learning the ability of economists, as well as how eﬃciently employers
select economists. Smeets, Warzynski and Coupe (2006) analyze how initial and later placement
of economists vary with the reputation of the graduate program attended. They ﬁnd that top
graduates from second-tier economics departments are initially employed at better jobs than second-
tier graduates from top departments. However, they ﬁnd that the top department graduates end
up producing more research and in better long-term positions. They speculate that this indicates
some form of ineﬃciency in the initial allocation of economists or that schools put a lot of resources
into marketing their best students. Using a very diﬀerent dataset and diﬀerent measures of success,
Id on o tﬁnd a similar bias towards hiring top students at second tier schools. I discuss possible
reasons for this apparent diﬀerence in results in Section 4.4.2
2U s i n gav e r yd i ﬀerent approach, Chen and McKinnish (2005) argue that economics departments search for new
faculty optimally in terms of breadth of ﬁelds. They develop a model where breadth of search for new economists is
positively correlated with the quality of the searching department. This correlation stems from top departments’ high
standards demanding they search broadly in order to insure a large enough pool of qualiﬁed applicants and the fact
that, because high quality departments quickly dispose of many applications, they incur a relatively low cost from
searching broadly. They ﬁnd evidence consistent with this model, using listings in Job Openings for Economists.
42 A Model of The Economist Labor Market
In this section, I derive a stylized model of the economist labor market that will motivate the
empirical work to follow. The model makes several assumptions that appear to be consistent with
this market.
Assumption 1: Institutions that employ economists can be ordered (or at least categorized) with
respect to how attractive it is to work there.3
Assumption 2: Economists vary in their research “ability” where ability is a combination of
innate talent and human capital developed in school and on-the-job.
Assumption 3: It is eﬃcient to match high-ability economists to more attractive positions. That
is, like Gibbons et al. (2005) and many others, I will simply analyze eﬃcient matching rather
than modeling the ﬁrm’s underlying optimization problem. I will take it as given that high-ranked
institutions will make oﬀers to the high ability economists and that, on average, an economist will
want to work for the highest ranked institution that she can.4 In future work, I hope to use this
data to draw inferences about optimal organizational design.
Assumpution 4: Economists and institutions engage in an initial match upon graduation. They
then re-match based on updated information at the beginning of a second (and ﬁnal) period. This
assumption essentially takes a typical U.S. university tenure system as given. I leave explaining
why such a system exists to others (see, for example, Carmichael (1988) and Kahn and Huberman
(1988)).
With these assumptions in mind, consider economist i, entering the labor market (so she is
entering career period y =1 )i ny e a rt. Her ability is αiy (or αi1). Let Et(αiy|xiyt;ziyt) be the
market’s (that is, the typical hiring institution) estimate of her ability as of t. x is a vector of
characteristics that are observable to the market and the econometrician, such as scholarships
received, what graduate program she attended, and nationality. ziyt (or, more speciﬁc a l l yi nt h i s
context, zi1t) is information that is observed by the market when she is looking for a job but
not observed by the econometrician. This includes information in letters of reference, as well as
assessments made during interviews and job talks. Deﬁne εi1 = αi1 − Et(αi1|xi1t;zi1t).A s s u m i n g
the market’s expectations of new economists are rational, the distribution of εi1 will have mean
zero. Let σ2
ε1 be the variance of εi1.5
3I will allow for individual variance in preference. However, I will assume, for example, that most people would
prefer to work at a research university relative to a teaching-oriented college.
4Models that would justify this assumption include Miller (1984) and MacDonald (1982), as well as others where
ability diﬀerences lead to comparative advantage across types of jobs.
5Note that if the distribution of ε diﬀers among economists, then employers may well have an incentive to trade
5If Et(αi1|xi1t;zi1t) >m 1t (that is, if the market’s assessment of her ability is above some cut-
oﬀ), she goes to sector 1.6 If not, then she goes to sector 0.7 As shown in Oyer (2006a), the ability
cut-oﬀ depends on labor market conditions in the year the person seeks her initial position. That
is, if labor market conditions are more favorable in year g than in year h, m1h >m 1g.
During period 1, two things may change the market’s assessment of her ability — her ability
may change as she gains human capital and the market may get a more informed signal of her
innate ability. Assume that αiy is determined by a combination of innate talent (αi)a n dh u m a n
capital developed on the job. Any human capital gained before entering the labor market (that is,
in school) is ﬁxed for this analysis, so I can deﬁne αi1 = αi. I model human capital acquisition
during career period 1 as αi2 = αi+Σ1
j=0βjsj1 where sj1 =1if she spends career period 1 in sector
j. In other words, second period ability is either αi +β0 or αi +β1, depending on which sector she
works in during the ﬁrst period.
Let pi2 be the person’s publication record at the beginning of the second period. Assume that
publication history is an additive combination of ability and random factors such that pi2 = αi2+δi.
Assume δ comes from a distribution with mean zero and variance σ2
δ. That is, I am assuming that
the type of job the person gets in the ﬁrst period aﬀects her human capital and, therefore, her
publication record as of the start of the second period. It will prove useful to rewrite pi2 = αi2 +δi
as pi2 = αi + Σ1
j=0βjsj1 + δi.
Now consider economist i, entering the second period of her career (y =2 )i ny e a rt.N o w
Et(αi2|xi2t,p i2,s i1;zi2t) is the market’s updated estimate of her ability as of t.N o t et h a tt h em a r k e t
now conditions its expectations on her period 1 sector and publications. Given these expectations,
she engages in a second match with the market. Speciﬁcally, she works in sector 1 in period 2 if
Et(αi2|xi2t,p i2,s i1;zi2t) >m 2t. The market’s (or the econometrician’s) estimate of her ability may
still be imperfect, so deﬁne εi2 = αi2 − Et(αi2|xi2t,p i2,s i1;zi2t) and σ2
ε2 to be the variance of εi2.
This model of the economist labor market suggests a system of equations with three endogenous
variables — sectors in the two periods and publication productivity in period 1. More speciﬁcally,
one can think of the careers of economists as being characterized by the following three equations:
si1 = I[Et(αi1|xi1t;zi1t) >m 1t] (1)
oﬀ expectations about α and ε. That is, it may pay to hire “risky” workers (as in Lazear (1998)), especially given
the ease with which negative realizations on ability can be discarded through the tenure process. I brieﬂyd i s c u s s
how this could be empirically relevant to the analysis below in Section 4.4.
6The ﬁrst and second subscripts on m are for career period and year, respectively. This allows the employers to use
diﬀerent ability cutoﬀsa td i ﬀerent stages of economists’ careers and for the cutoﬀ to vary with demand conditions.
7In the empirical analyses, I will allow for more than two sectors.
6pi2 = αi + Σ2
j=1βjsj1 + δi (2)
si2 = I[Et(αi2|xi2t,p i2,s i1;zi2t) >m 2t] (3)
where I[.] is the indicator function. Using this theoretical framework, I will use data on economists
to address four questions.
First, is there evidence that on-the-job human capital development does, in fact, aﬀect produc-
tivity? This would imply that β1 >β 0.
Second, I look for evidence that employers of economists use ﬁrst-period productivity (pi2)t o
infer ability (αi). This would suggest that σ2
ε2 will be smaller than σ2
ε1 a n dt h a te q u a t i o n( 3 )w i l l
be estimated more precisely than (1).
Third, I look for systematic evidence that, on average, economists move “down” over the course
of their careers. This would show up empirically if m2t >m 1t. At this point, I will make no attempt
to isolate the exact reasons underlying this feature of the economist market.
Finally, I look for evidence to suggest possible systematic bias when hiring new economists by
seeing if corr(xi1t,ε i1) 6=0for some x characteristics.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 Data
Before getting into the details of how I will attempt to estimate the model sketched in the last
section, I describe the available data. I generated a panel dataset of the careers of graduates
of seven economics PhD programs — the University of California at Berkeley, the University of
Chicago, the University of Minnesota, MIT, Northwestern University, Stanford University, and the
University of Texas. I got information on individuals at the time they entered the labor market
from the books of CVs that each of these departments compiles and distributes every fall. I have
the books for each fall from 1979 through 2003 for two of the seven schools. The initial books in
the other ﬁve schools’ series are from 1980, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1987. I then used various sources
to track all the people in the CV books year-by-year through 2004. I also matched economists with
their publications using the online version of “EconLit.”8
The three endogenous variables highlighted in the model above are “sector” of ﬁrst job after
8For further details on construction of the career and publications datasets, see Oyer (2006a).
7graduation, sector at some date later in economists’ careers, and publication record at this same
later date.9 Picking the starting point for period 2 requires some thought. On the one hand, the
later I wait, the more the processes of learning and human capital development (not to mention long
publication lags) will have unfolded. On the other hand, every year that I wait to start period 2
requires throwing away a cohort of recent graduates that have not yet had careers of the appropriate
length. I ended up settling on ten years because this allows most people to go through the tenure
review process and, when necessary, the resulting second job search.10 Therefore, throughout the
analysis, career period 1 starts in the fall after the person is last listed in her school’s CV book and
period 2 begins in the fall ten years after the beginning of career period 1.
Rather than just the two sectors suggested in the model, I break the institutions that employ
economists into six sectors. Using the rankings of universities provided by econphd.net, I deﬁne a
person to be in the top sector (s =5 ) if she holds a tenure-track job at a school ranked in the top
10. Sector 4 includes tenure-track jobs at schools ranked 11-25 and sector 3 is tenure-track jobs
at other schools in the top 50. Sector 2 includes tenure-track jobs at all other schools ranked by
econphd.net and jobs at all non-academic institutions ranked by econphd.net. Sector 1 includes any
other person-year where I was able to identify the person’s job. Finally, sector 0 is all person-years
where I was not able to ﬁnd the person.11 Summarizing
• s =5if Top 10 job
• s =4if other Top 25 job
• s =3if other Top 50 job
• s =2if other ranked job
• s =1for all other non-missing jobs
• s =0if missing.
9Given that I have annual data on publications and jobs, I could look at sector or publications year-by-year rather
than just twice. However, as will become clear, it is diﬃcult enough to get enough exogenous variation when looking
at two dates. Adding more periods to the model would make the empirical work intractable.
10Many tenure reviews take place after six years. But that does not seem suﬃcient for my purposes because there
are many examples of people who still hold tenure-track jobs at highly ranked institutions six years after graduation,
despite having few or no publications. There are almost no such people after ten years.
11This predominantly consists of people who I never found and of person-years after some point where the person
is last found through EconLit, the AEA directories, or internet search. There are also a few cases where a person
is missing for a period in the middle of her career. If I ﬁrst ﬁnd the person one or more years after she left school,
I assume the job she held when I found her was the one she held since graduation. The results are not sensitive to
treating these observations as missing.
8Deﬁning productivity also requires exercising some judgment. I could simply use the number
of papers a person has published, but EconLit covers over 1,000 journals of widely varying impact.
Also, the distribution of publication counts is highly skewed. Lots of economists have zero publica-
tions at the start of career period 2 and most have three or fewer. However, more than ten percent
have more than ten published papers and some have many more. While taking the logs of number
of publications might smooth out the long-right tail, the fact that over a third of the sample has
zero publications presents a problem.
Iu s et h r e ed i ﬀerent measures of pi2, each of which has diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses. First,
Id e ﬁne “publication category” such that
• pi2 =0if the person has no published papers at the start of career period 2
• pi2 =1if the person has one or two published papers at the start of career period 2
• pi2 =2if the person has three to ﬁve published papers at the start of career period 2
• pi2 =3if the person has six to ten published papers at the start of career period 2
• pi2 =4if the person has eleven to twenty published papers at the start of career period 2
• pi2 =5if the person has more than twenty published papers at the start of career period 2.12
The second measure of pi2 is an indicator variable that equals one if the person has published at
least one paper in a “Top 5” journal (the American Economic Review, Econometrica,t h eJournal
of Political Economy,t h eQuarterly Journal of Economics,a n dt h eReview of Economic Studies)
at the start of period 2.
The third measure of pi2 is based on the “impact” of the journals where papers are published. I
created a total impact measure by adding together the Journal Citation Reports impact factors of
each journal where the person published a paper (adding the impact factor for the journal as many
times as the person published in that particular journal.)13 I used the impact factors provided on
Tom Coupe’s economist ranking web page (http://student.ulb.ac.be/~tcoupe/ranking.html) as of
March 21, 2006. Because these correspond to a single year’s measure of impact, there is quite a
bit of noise in this measure. Given that 37% of the sample had zero publications ten years after
leaving school, and another 7% had none in journals with positive impact factors, I could not take
12For details on the distribution of publications after ten years and the choice of the cutoﬀsi nd e ﬁning “publication
category”, see Oyer (2006a).
13To be very clear, if a person published two articles in a journal with an impact factor of 1, one in a journal with
an impact factor of 0.5, and one in a journal with an impact factor of 0.25, I assigned her a total impact of 2.75.
9logs of this highly-skewed measure. Therefore, the third deﬁnition of pi2 is the person’s percentile
in the total impact measure distribution. For the approximately 44% with total impact of zero, I
set pi2 =0 .2206.
The observable characteristics (that is, x) include several measures that should aﬀect the mar-
ket’s perception of the person’s ability as she leaves graduate school. The reputations of the
individual schools vary considerably, so indicator variables for which program the person attended
will be correlated with ability. From the CV, I was able to record whether the person received a
National Science Foundation (NSF) graduate fellowship, whether the person was honorable mention
for an NSF fellowship, and whether she was awarded a Sloan Foundation dissertation fellowship.
NSF fellowships are awarded when the person enters graduate school or one year later. Sloan
fellowships, which were discontinued in the late 1990’s, were given for the last year of graduate
study.
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1 for economists in the fall after they leave school
and the fall ten years later. The ﬁrst column shows all available observations while the second
column shows new graduates that can also be measured ten years later. The balanced sample in
the ﬁnal two columns includes 1,149 economists that last appeared in a CV book in the Fall of 1993
or earlier. The mix of schools across the balanced sample and the column (1) sample is diﬀerent
because schools vary in the ﬁrst year their CV books are available.
The sample is predominantly male. While most economists in both samples went to US under-
graduate schools, foreign students have become more common over time. NSF and Sloan fellowships
are given to a relatively small group. NSF grants are highly concentrated at one graduate school in
the sample. Sloan grants are more evenly spread among the schools, though the same school that
accounts for more than 80% of the NSF grants in the sample also accounts for more than 40% of
the Sloan grants.
In the estimates that follow, I will typically show the ﬁxed eﬀects for the school that ranks
highest (“School A”) and the one that ranks lowest (“School B”) by any measure of job outcomes
or publication productivity. The excluded category in these analyses is the school that ranks fourth
out of seven by most measures, so these ﬁxed eﬀects can be thought of as measures of whether
the top and bottom schools vary from the average. School A has the largest share of the sample
because it has slightly bigger classes, on average, than other schools and because its CV books are
available all the way back to 1979. The School B sample starts in the fall of 1983 and has noticeably
smaller graduating classes than most of the other schools.
Approximately 33% of the sample starts their career in a tenure-track job at a top 50 university.
However, after ten years, this fraction has dropped to 22%. After ten years, the average number
10First Job 10 Years
All Balanced Sample After Graduation
Female 21.2% 19.6% 19.6%
US undergrad 59.0% 67.5% 67.5%
NSF Graduate Fellowship 11.1% 13.8% 13.8%
Sloan Dissertation Fellowship 8.3% 11.3% 11.3%
Grad School A 22.8% 27.2% 27.2%
Grad School B 6.9% 6.2% 6.2%
% by Sector:
Top 10 (s =5 ) 12.6% 13.2% 9.5%
Other Top 25 (s =4 ) 10.7% 12.0% 7.1%
Other Top 50 (s =3 ) 7.1% 7.7% 5.6%
Other Ranked 35.4% 34.4% 32.8%
Non-Missing 24.1% 24.1% 29.4%
Missing 10.1% 8.6% 15.6%
Papers:
Average Number 0.129 0.131 4.453
Top 5 Journal Indicator 1.1% 1.4% 25.2%
Observations 2,324 1,149 1,149
Table 1: Summary Statistics. The sample is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books.
The ﬁrst two columns are means of each variable as of the Fall after the person last appears in a CV
book. “All” includes all people from books sent out in 1979-2003. “Balanced Sample” includes those
in books sent out in the Fall of 1993 or before so that it matches the sample of people ten years after
leaving school. The ﬁnal column includes this same sample ten years later. Grad Schools A & B
are the highest and lowest ranked programs in terms of average success of initial placement over the
available time frame. “Top 10” and other ratings are based on econphd.net rankings of institutions
and only include people with tenure-track jobs. “Ranked” indicates a tenure-track position at a
university ranked by econphd.net or a position at a non-university ranked by econphd.net. Average
number of papers includes all journal articles in EconLit and “Top 5 Journal Indicator” equals one
if the person has published in one of the Top 5 economics journals (see text for list.)
11of publications is about four-and-a-half, the median is two, and about a quarter of the sample
has published a paper in a Top 5 journal. There are nine economists with twenty-ﬁve or more
publications after ten years.
3.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Identiﬁcation
Given the discrete nature of the sector measure, as well as two of the three productivity measures,
I would ideally like to estimate ordered logit or ordered probit versions of equations (1)-(3). This
presents no problems in the case of the initial placement equation because there are no endogenous
variables on the right-hand side of the equation. Therefore, the ﬁrst empirical equation updates
equation (1) to be
si1 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=5 if a + bxi1t + ηi1t ≥ m5t1
=4 if m5t1 >a+ bxi1t + ηi1t ≥ m4t1
=3 if m4t1 >a+ bxi1t + ηi1t ≥ m3t1
=2 if m3t1 >a+ bxi1t + ηi1t ≥ m2t1
=1 if m2t1 >a+ bxi1t + ηi1t ≥ m1t1
=0 if m1t1 >a+ bxi1t + ηi1t.
(4)
Note that the sector cutoﬀs( m) now have three subscripts. The ﬁrst is for the sector, the second
for the calendar year when the person starts career period 1, and the third is the career period.
Equation (2) cannot be estimated as written above because I do not observe αi. Therefore, I
will estimate productivity empirically through the speciﬁcation
pi2 = c + dxi1t + Σ5
j=0βjI(si1 = j)+δi. (5)
This includes any proxies for ability known when the person enters the job market (that is,
xi1t). The coeﬃcients on the sector indicator variables (that is, the β’s) capture the eﬀect of human
capital developed in the ﬁrst period on productivity. However, this presents a challenge because
ﬁrst-period placement cannot be thought of as exogenous. Unobserved factors will aﬀect both
si1 and pi2, so I need an instrument for si1 to properly estimate (5). As in Oyer (2006a), I use
the number of academic job listings in Job Openings for Economists (JOE) or a set of indicator
variables for year of market entry as instruments. In using the JOE variable as an instrument, I
am assuming it aﬀects initial placement because it reﬂects demand for economists but that macro
conditions at graduation only aﬀect productivity through their eﬀect on initial placement. The
graduation year indicators have the advantage relative to the JOE variable that they make fewer
12parametric assumptions about how demand varies from year-to-year for new economists. However,
using class indicators as instruments requires the assumption that variations in average ability
among graduating cohorts do not explain the variation in placement success for the group as a
whole. This requires that demand be determined independent of economist ability which could
happen if, for example, schools are assigned “slots” and they ﬁll them independent of the average
quality of new economists.
Finally, the second period sector can now be written
si2 =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=5 if e + fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t ≥ m5t2
=4 if m5t2 >e+ fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t ≥ m4t2
=3 if m4t2 >e+ fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t ≥ m3t2
=2 if m3t2 >e+ fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t ≥ m2t2
=1 if m2t2 >e+ fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t ≥ m1t2
=0 if m1t2 >e+ fxi2t + gpi2 + Σ5
j=0hjI(si1 = j)+ηi2t.
(6)
It is more diﬃcult to solve the endogeneity problem for this equation, given that there are
two endogenous explanatory variables. Given a few more instruments, I could estimate all three
equations simultaneously using three-stage least squares or a GMM estimator. But I cannot justify
excluding enough variables to identify all three equations. Alternatively, I could impose more
structure and assumptions on the system of equations, but I do not have a realistic model in
mind that would identify all the parameters. Therefore, at this stage I will settle for estimating
various versions of the reduced form of the second period sector equation. I will then compare the
coeﬃcients and goodness-of-ﬁtw i t ht h eﬁrst period sector to draw tentative conclusions about the
learning process.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Initial Placement
I now use a series of ordered logits to estimate equation (4). The dependent variable is higher at
institutions that rank the highest, so positive coeﬃcients are associated with better ranking. The
sample in the ﬁrst two columns is all available initial placements, which includes people who started
jobs in a summer or fall between 1980 and 2004. Columns (3) and (4) limits the sample to the
“balanced sample” from the second column of Table 1, which will be the sample when estimating
equation (6) below.
First, note that there is no relationship between ﬁrst placement and the two demographic
13characteristics (gender and country of undergraduate institution.) This is consistent with (though
not proof of) graduate schools not discriminating along either of these dimensions, or at least not
discriminating diﬀerently than hiring institutions. If, for example, there were substantial gender
discrimination in admissions (or aﬃrmative action in favor of women), I would expect the women at
a given school to be better (worse) job market candidates than the men and the female coeﬃcient
would be positive (negative) in the initial placement analyses.
Not surprisingly, the highest ranked school does signiﬁcantly better with initial placements than
the middle school and the lowest ranked does worse. Column (1) shows that NSF fellowships are also
associated with better initial placements, even controlling for graduate institution. Note, however,
that much of this relationship goes away when Sloan fellowships are added to the speciﬁcation in
Column (2). The Sloan coeﬃcient is much larger than the NSF coeﬃcient, though both are roughly
e q u a l l yl i k e l yi nt h er a wd a t a .T h i si st h eﬁr s te v i d e n c ec o n s i s t e n tw i t hl e a r n i n gp l a y i n gar o l ei n
economist placement. NSF fellowships are awarded near the beginning of graduate school when
information about an economist’s potential is relatively noisy. After the professors at a graduate
school get a better signal of students’ ability, they are asked to nominate candidates for Sloan
fellowships. This is more closely related to the market’s estimate of economists’ ability shortly
thereafter when they go on the job market.
The results for the balanced sample, in columns (3) and (4), are almost identical to those for
the whole sample, though the standard errors are somewhat higher due to the smaller sample
size. The one diﬀerence of any note is that the coeﬃcient on US undergraduates is higher in the
balanced sample. However, it is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 15-17% level. Taking
the coeﬃcients literally, it would suggest that, before 1994, US undergraduates got more prestigious
appointments than foreign students. Such a result could be caused by preferences for foreigners
to return to their home countries (which would hurt their placement record because foreign US
institutions tend to rank highly and because it would increase the chance I would not ﬁnd them
so that they would be assigned si1 =0 ), immigration costs, or even a bigger advantage for English
speakers in face-to-face interviews relative to written graduate student applications. However, given
that the result is not even statistically signiﬁcant, it is not worth trying to distinguish among these
explanations.
4.2 Productivity
I now try to estimate equation (5). That is, I look at how research productivity during the ﬁrst
ten years of an economists’ career (period 1)i sa ﬀected by individual characteristics and human
capital. Table 3 displays the results of seven speciﬁcations of the productivity equation (that is,
14All Years Before 1994
( 1 )( 2 ) ( 3 )( 4 )
Female -0.0086 -0.0139 0.0823 0.0672
(0.0923) (0.0923) (0.1356) (0.1360)
U.S. undergrad 0.0395 0.0527 0.1719 0.1785
(0.0837) (0.0839) (0.1236) (0.1239)
Grad School A 0.7006 0.7045 0.6853 0.6554
(0.1306) (0.1309) (0.1829) (0.1833)
Grad School B -1.429 -1.389 -1.313 -1.294
(0.1704) (0.1711) (0.2515) (0.2526)
NSF 0.2335 0.1516 0.3103 0.1860
(0.0705) (0.0711) (0.0947) (0.0962)
Sloan 1.518 1.390
(0.1469) (0.1871)
Observations 2,324 2,324 1,149 1,149
Pseudo R2 0.0339 0.0481 0.0358 0.0505
Table 2: Initial Placement. An observation is a person. Each column shows the coeﬃcients from an
ordered logit where the dependent variable is ﬁve if the person holds a tenure-track job at a top-10
university (based on “econphd.net” rankings) in the Fall after she last appears in her school’s book
of CVs, four if she holds one at a top-25 (but not top-10) university, three if she holds one at a
top-50 (but not top-25) university, two if she holds a tenure-track job at a university that is ranked
(but not in the top-50) by econphd.net or a non-university that is ranked by econphd.net, one if
she holds any other known job, and zero if she could not be found. The sample is limited to people
who appear in two or fewer CV books. In columns (3) and (4), the sample is further limited so
that it only includes people who were last in a CV book in 1993 or earlier so that the same sample
can be used to analyze jobs ten years after leaving school. All the displayed explanatory variables
are indicator variables. “Grad School A” is an indicator for graduating from the highest ranked of
the seven graduate institutions. “Grad School B” is an indicatory for graduating from the lowest
ranked institution. Each regression also has a full set of indicator variables for year on job market
and graduate institutions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
15analyses where pi2 is the dependent variable.) In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the
“publication category” variable deﬁned in Section 3.1. Column (1) reports the results of an ordered
logit, which would be the natural way to analyze this categorical dependent variable. However,
I will instrument for initial job rank in some speciﬁcations and it is more practical to do this in
a least squares regression. For comparison purposes, column (2) reports an OLS regression with
the same explanatory variables as the Column (1) ordered logit. Column (3) reports the results
of a two-stage least squares regression where I instrument for initial job rank using the number of
academic job openings in JOE the year the person last went on the job market. The rest of the
table shows the results of OLS and IV regressions that are similar to those in columns (2) and (3)
but use the other measures of pi2.14
First note that all the regressions that do not include initial job rank as an explanatory variable
show relationships one might expect between various characteristics and research productivity.
Women produce less, which is likely due to the fact that the ﬁrst ten years after getting a PhD are
a period with a high probability of having children. This probably leads many women to take some
time oﬀ from research. Those who went to US undergraduate institutions also are more productive,
which may reﬂect the lower cost of writing in English.
As one might expect given the initial placement results, School A graduates are relatively
productive and School B graduates publish substantially less than other PhDs. Again, NSF and
Sloan fellowships, which are likely to be correlated with expected ability, predict greater research
output. As with initial placement, the fellowship that is awarded later in graduate school (Sloan) is
a more informative predictor. These relationships largely hold up in the IV regressions that control
for initial placement.
The IV results in columns (3), (5), and (7) all have coeﬃcients that are consistent with econo-
mists building more research-oriented human capital if they work at more prestigious research
institutions. The coeﬃcients in columns (3) and (7) are signiﬁcant at the 10% and 7% levels, re-
spectively. The job rank coeﬃcient that can be most easily interpreted is the 0.09 in column (7).
This implies that moving up from a top 25 job to a top 10 job (or from a ranked job outside the top
50 to a Top 50 job or any other move up one job rank) leads to an increase of 9% in where the person
stands in the cumulative distribution of impact for people with ten years of experience. In other
words, suppose an economist would get an initial job at a school ranked 75th under certain macro
conditions when she graduates and that she wouldh a v eb e e ni nt h e6 0 t hp e r c e n t i l eo ft h ei m p a c t
distribution if she started her career at that institution. But now suppose the same economist
14Though some of the variables are diﬀerent, the IV regressions are similar to those in Oyer (2006a).
16Dependent Variable Publication Category Top 5 Impact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.4655 -0.4316 -0.4506 -0.1068 -0.1079 -0.0636 -0.0673
(0.1353) (0.1098) (0.0984) (0.0314) (0.0304) (0.0199) (0.0175)
U.S. undergrad 0.3024 0.1862 0.1287 0.0400 0.0346 0.0464 0.0350
(0.1271) (0.0992) (0.0975) (0.0283) (0.0301) (0.0180) (0.0173)
Grad School A 0.6080 0.4390 0.2229 0.1336 0.1237 0.1005 0.0603
(0.1869) (0.1470) (0.1827) (0.0420) (0.0565) (0.0267) (0.0324)
Grad School B -0.6711 -0.5762 -0.1657 -0.1322 -0.1092 -0.1173 -0.0387
(0.2703) (0.2059) (0.3106) (0.0588) (0.0960) (0.0374) (0.0551)
NSF 0.1936 0.1881 0.1019 0.0455 0.0406 0.0352 0.0194
(0.0965) (0.0763) (0.0802) (0.0218) (0.0248) (0.0139) (0.0142)
Sloan 0.6645 0.5619 0.0341 0.2544 0.2252 0.1370 0.0387
(0.1765) (0.1410) (0.3158) (0.0403) (0.0976) (0.0260) (0.0560)
Initial Job Rank 0.4850 0.0262 0.0900
(0.2783) (0.0860) (0.0493)
Observations 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149
R2 (or pseudo R2) 0.0333 0.1082 0.1163 0.1341
Table 3: Publication Productivity. An observation is a person ten years after her last appearance
i naC Vb o o k .S e et e x tf o rd e ﬁnitions of dependent variables. Column (1) displays the coeﬃcients
from an ordered logit. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are based on OLS regressions. Columns (3), (5),
and (7) are based on IV regressions where the number of academic listings in Job Openings for
Economists in the year the person last appears in a CV book is used to instrument for Initial Job
Rank. The sample is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books. All the displayed
explanatory variables are indicator variables except initial job rank. “Grad School A” is an indicator
for graduating from the highest ranked of the seven graduate institutions. “Grad School B” is an
indicatory for graduating from the lowest ranked institution. Each regression also has a full set
of indicator variables for year on job market and graduate institutions. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
17graduates in a more favorable economic climate and gets a job at a school ranked 40th. She would
now be expected to create research with impact that would place her in the 69th percentile for an
economist with ten years of experience. While it is hard to say what a “large” eﬀect would be, this
suggests that the type of job a person gets has an important eﬀect on her research productivity.
I reran the IV speciﬁcations using a set of graduating year indicator variables to instrument for
initial job rank. As mentioned above, the validity of this instrument requires stronger assumptions
but allows me to estimate the ﬁrst stage regression more ﬂexibly. The coeﬃcients on “initial job
rank” are similar but more precise using this instrument. They are positive and signiﬁcant at the
6% (column (3)), 17% (column (5)), and 5% (column (7)) levels.
4.3 Second Period Placement
I now consider the matching of economists to jobs at the beginning of career period 2. I run ordered
logits to estimate factors associated with si2, though I will be cautious in claiming “eﬀects” given
that I will include some endogenous explanatory variables. Nevertheless, the results here, and
comparisons with estimates of factors driving ﬁrst period placement, will allow me to draw some
conclusions about how standards develop over economists’ careers and how employers learn about
economists’ ability over their careers.
The results are in Table 4. Column (1) repeats the initial placement ordered logit in column (4)
of Table 2 for comparison purposes. Column (2) repeats the exact same analysis on the exact same
sample ten years later. Nothing changes from column (1) to column (2) except for the value of the
dependent variable for any economist that changes sectors in the ten years after initial placement.
Note ﬁrst that the results in the two columns look remarkably similar. Gender and undergrad-
uate country are still insigniﬁcant. The highest and lowest ranked graduate schools have similar
eﬀects on placement. The coeﬃcients are somewhat reduced (in absolute value), but this is to be
expected given that the distribution of the dependent variable is tighter in the column (2) sample
(see Table 1.) The fellowship eﬀects are also similar across the two time frames.
There is some evidence of learning in that the goodness-of-ﬁt for the regression (the pseudo-R2
of the ordered logit) is smaller in column (2). This is consistent with the notion that employers
are getting more accurate readings of economists’ ability over this ten year period. While they
had approximately the right average correlation between graduate school (for example) and initial
placement, they rely less on these observed characteristics when making second period employment
matches.
Columns (3) and (4) run the same speciﬁcation on the same samples as columns (1) and (2),
respectively, but include the person’s publication record at the start of period 2 (that is, pi2)a sa n
18Initial 10 Years Initial 10 Years 10 Years 10 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.0672 -0.1964 0.3516 0.0644 -0.2154 -0.0599
(0.1360) (0.1406) (0.1402) (0.1424) (0.1440) (0.1468)
U.S. undergrad 0.1785 0.1145 0.0185 -0.0733 0.0408 -0.0669
(0.1239) (0.1243) (0.1260) (0.1271) (0.1293) (0.1318)
Grad School A 0.6554 0.4995 0.3058 0.1122 0.0860 -0.0625
(0.1833) (0.1864) (0.1881) (0.1895) (0.1932) (0.1962)
Grad School B -1.294 -0.8526 -1.037 -0.4850 -0.1578 -0.0763
(0.2526) (0.2494) (0.2579) (0.2592) (0.2628) (0.2676)
NSF 0.1860 0.2104 0.0742 0.1035 0.0838 0.0245
(0.0962) (0.0986) (0.0966) (0.0968) (0.1001) (0.1010)
Sloan 1.390 1.214 1.003 0.8025 0.2976 0.2235
(0.1871) (0.1823) (0.1886) (0.1842) (0.1897) (0.1931)
10-Year Impact 4.050 4.901 3.099
(0.2418) (0.2563) (0.2737)
Initial Job Rank 1.307 1.080
(0.0571) (0.0600)
Observations 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149 1,149
Pseudo R2 0.0505 0.0379 0.1338 0.1560 0.2243 0.2621
Table 4: Second-Period Placement. An observation is a person either in the year after last appearing
in a CV book (columns 1 and 3) or ten years after last appearing in a CV book (other columns).
The sample in all columns is limited to people available for the 10-year analyses. Each column
shows the coeﬃcients from an ordered logit. See Table 2 for details on the dependent variable
and sample. 10-year impact is where the person stands in the cumulative distribution of impact-
weighted publications as of the time of the observation. Initial job rank is the same as the dependent
variable in column 1. “Grad School A” is an indicator for graduating from the highest ranked of
the seven graduate institutions. “Grad School B” is an indicator for graduating from the lowest
ranked institution. Each regression also has a full set of indicator variables for year on job market
and graduate institutions. Standard errors are in parentheses.
19explanatory variable. As shown above, ﬁrst period placement aﬀects productivity and, as shown in
Oyer (2006a), initial placement also aﬀects later placement. So I cannot think of the productivity
variable as entirely exogenous. However, I would hope that the primary determinant of productivity
is ability and that I can think of productivity as a critical means through which the market learns
about the economist’s ability.
Column (4) shows that ﬁrst period research productivity is highly correlated with second period
sector. Speciﬁcally, the 4.9 coeﬃcient on 10-Year Impact means that an economist that is 20
percentage points higher than another economist in the impact distribution during period one will
be one sector higher than the other economist in the second period job match. In other words, if
one economist is at the median of the impact distribution and holds a job at a ranked institution
not in the Top 50 (that is, si2 =2 ), then an economist that is equivalent at the seventieth percentile
of the impact distribution who is otherwise equivalent to the ﬁrst economist could expect to hold
a Top 26-50 (si2 =3 )j o b .
As mentioned above, it would be inappropriate to interpret this relationship between second
period sector and ﬁrst period productivity as causal. Column (3) provides strong evidence to
support this concern, because it shows that productivity in the ﬁrst period is highly correlated with
initial job sector. This relationship was to be expected, given the results in Table 3. Note, however,
that the coeﬃcient on 10-Year Impact is higher for the 10 Year sample (that is, the coeﬃcient is
higher in column (4) than in (3)) and remember that, other things equal, the coeﬃcient should
go down over time as the variance in the dependent variable gets smaller. Therefore, though any
result with an endogenous right-hand-side variable should be interpreted cautiously, a comparison of
columns (3) and (4) provides evidence that is at least consistent with employers drawing inferences
about economists’ ability from publication productivity (or, equivalently, that they learn about
economists’ ability during period 1 and ability is correlated with productivity.) The pseudo-R2
statistics of these two speciﬁcations also suggest learning, in that there is a better ﬁta f t e rt e n
years.
Note that, when comparing columns (4) and (2), the eﬀects of all the exogenous variables are
lowered when controlling for publication productivity. This result (though complicated by the
endogeneity issue) and the comparison between columns (1) and (2) are similar to the results in
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001). The fact that the coeﬃcients are largely
unchanged from column (1) to (2), while the goodness-of-ﬁt decreases, suggests that the market
makes correct “average” guesses about ability using observable characteristics. However, over time,
the market focuses more on unobserved ability measures, which lowers the explanatory power of the













Table 5: Estimates of Sector Cut-Oﬀs. These cut-oﬀs correspond to the ordered logits in the ﬁrst
two columns of the prior table.
this case, productivity) increases overall explanatory power while lowering the eﬀect of observable
characteristics that aﬀect outcomes only because of their use in drawing inferences about expected
ability. Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) draw these inferences by looking
at how pay progresses over workers’ careers, rather than how job sector develops.
Columns (5) and (6) run two more ordered logit speciﬁcations on second-period sector as-
signment. They add a variable (initial job sector) that has the downside of further complicating
endogeneity issues but the advantage of providing a measure of the market’s estimate of the econo-
mist’s ability at the start of the ﬁrst career period. In both regressions, the coeﬃcient is one or
above, suggesting that a better ﬁrst job will, in expectation, be associated with a better job later
on.15 Interpreting initial job rank as a measure of initial market expectations about ability, it is no
great surprise that no other observable characteristics known at the time of initial job search have
as i g n i ﬁcant correlation with second period job sector. However, even controlling for ﬁrst-period
sector, ﬁrst-period productivity is related to second-period sector. This suggests that the market
learns about the economist early in her career and uses this learning to assign her in the second
period.
Table 5 provides further details on the ordered logits in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The
ordered logit estimates the cut-oﬀs for each sector corresponding to the m’s in equations (4) and (6).
Because the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4 use exactly the same sample and explanatory variables,
the estimated m’s can be compared to determine if standards change over a person’s career. If
15In Oyer (2006a), I estimate that 50-80% of random improvements in initial job placement will be permanent.
That is, getting an initial job that is one unit better along some dimension will lead to a job that is 0.5-0.8 units
better in period 2.
21the cutoﬀs get higher over time, this indicates that standards to get into a given job sector rise
over time. That is, m’s that are higher in column (2) than in column (1) indicate that, everything
else equal, a person can expect to move to a less prestigious job in the ﬁrst ten years after initial
placement. In all ﬁve cases, the estimated cutoﬀs do increase. Though they are not individually
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, all the cutoﬀs suggest that the cutoﬀs get more demanding over time. In
an unreported ordered logit, I combined all the observations in both speciﬁcations in Table 5
and included an indicator for an observation at the tenth year. This coeﬃcient was positive and
signiﬁcant, implying that the joint test that each pair of coeﬃcients in Table 5 is equivalent can be
rejected.
4.4 Are Initial Placements Rational?
Though some of the analysis to this point has already touched on this, I now look for evidence that
initial placements systematically misallocate economists of some observable type. For example, if
women or graduates of School B are, on average, undervalued when they graduate, the analysis in
this section will hopefully ﬁnd some evidence of this.
The way I will approach this question is to look at how changes in types of jobs are related to
individual characteristics. That is, I will combine equations (4) and (6) and then use logits or OLS
to estimate
f(si2,s i1)=h + kxi1t + ϕi (7)
where f is some function of the change in sector (or a more-detailed measure of job rank) between
initial placement and second-period placement. The three variations on the f function that I will
use are an indicator for whether the person moved to a lower ranked sector (that is, f(si2,s i1)=
I(si2 <s i1)), the change in sector (si2 − si1), and the change in the econphd.net ranking of the
institution where the person works.
This approach will uncover systematic, but “honest”, mistakes. If, for example, women are
discriminated against at both the initial and later phases, then this will not lead to women being
any more likely than men to change sectors. But if each employer wants the highest ability person
for any position and the market systematically underestimates women’s early career productivity,
then women will be more likely than men to move to more prestigious jobs.
Table 6 displays the results. Column (1) shows the results when the full sample is used and
the dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the person moves to a “worse” sector.
This creates problems, because the people with initial placement in higher-ranked sectors have to
22Dependent Variable Sector Drop Sector Drop Sector Drop ∆Sector ∆ Rank
Sample All sit =5 sit ∈ [3,5] sit ∈ [2,4] 50 < rank < 150
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.0385 -0.1989 -0.0417 -0.2565 17.29
(0.0338) (0.1212) (0.0669) (0.1139) (26.84)
U.S. undergrad 0.0116 -0.0435 -0.0295 -0.0657 26.87
(0.0314) (0.1203) (0.0668) (0.1045) (23.11)
Grad School A 0.0189 0.0011 -0.0890 0.0239 -3.54
(0.0459) (0.1485) (0.0899) (0.1472) (32.58)
Grad School B -0.1695 N/A -0.0485 -0.3678 160.16
(0.0755) (0.2187) (0.3222) (96.93)
NSF -0.0097 -0.0914 -0.0327 -0.0438 -7.91
(0.0237) (0.0646) (0.0397) (0.0776) (19.58)
Sloan 0.0025 -0.1323 -0.0706 0.0527 -39.79
(0.0432) (0.1039) (0.0703) (0.1594) (33.86)
Academic JOE 0.3127 1.0602 0.5480 -1.5056 -39.02
(0.1794) (0.6433) (0.3712) (0.6121) (140.15)
Observations 1,149 151 376 618 171
Pseudo R2 0.0162 0.1133 0.0462 0.0355 0.0580
Table 6: Change in Job Quality. “Sector” (sit)i sd e ﬁned in prior tables and in the text. Columns
1-3 show marginal coeﬃcients from logits where the dependent variable is an indicator variable that
equals one if the person’s sector ten years after leaving school is lower ranked than her sector right
after leaving school. Column 4 shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable
is the sector ten years after leaving school minus the sector right after leaving school. Column 5
shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the econphd.net rank of
the person’s institution ten years after leaving school minus the rank of her institution right after
leaving school.
be more likely to drop sectors than those who sort to lower sectors. Not surprisingly, I ﬁnd School
B graduates are less likely to drop sectors, but this may be because they have fewer opportunities
to drop sectors. The only other remotely signiﬁcant coeﬃcient is on the “Academic JOE”v a r i a b l e
that was used as an instrument in the productivity regressions. The coeﬃcient indicates that
economists who left school in a year with 10% more JOE listings than another year will have 3%
higher probability of dropping sectors than graduates from the comparison year. This is relative to
an unconditional probability of 30% and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 9% level.
The positive coeﬃcient on the macroeconomic variable is somewhat expected in column (1)
given that graduates in good years place better and, therefore, have more opportunity to fall.
However, in all speciﬁcations, the sign on this variable indicates that graduates in good economic
23times are more likely to fall to less prestigious positions in their ﬁr s tt e ny e a r s . T h ee ﬀect is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level in column (2) and at the 2% level in column (4). In column 4, the 1.51
coeﬃcient suggests that a 10% increase in JOE listings is associated with an expected move down
of 0.15 sectors over the ﬁrst ten years after a cohort leaves school.
Column 2 analyzes the 151 people who obtain initial sector 5 (that is, tenure-track Top 10)
positions. While this is a small sample, 46% of them drop so there is a fair amount of variation.
T h ef e m a l ec o e ﬃcient, which is signiﬁcant at the 10.1% conﬁdence level, indicates that women
who obtain Top 10 positions are much more likely to keep them than men. Unfortunately, this
variable, even if it can be considered statistically signiﬁcant, is particularly hard to interpret. It
could indicate the very diﬀerent possibilities that women are discriminated against in initial hiring
(though the results in Tables 2 and 4 do not imply this) or that they are given aﬃrmative action
at the promotion and tenure phase. Alternatively, it could just be that many women stop or slow
down their tenure clocks and they are less likely to have actually matched to their ﬁnal sector after
ten years. In any case, this eﬀect is reversed in column 4, which suggests, relative to men, women
who start in sectors 2-4 (that is, tenure track jobs at ranked institutions outside the Top 10) are
likely to move to less prestigious sectors. Together, these results are consistent with women being
somewhat favored at the very top institutions and men being favored at other research institutions.
But making any ﬁrm conclusion along these lines would require further analysis.
Besides the female and JOE variables, there are no signiﬁcant or consistent results in the table.
The general lack of signiﬁcance of the graduate school eﬀects suggests that employers of economists
do not systematically overestimate or underestimate the ability of graduates of particular schools.
However, Smeets et al. (2006) argue that second-tier graduates of top-tier graduate programs
are systematically underplaced and end up moving “up” relative to top graduates of second-tier
programs. The fact that this pattern does not show up in Table 6 could be due to any of several
factors. For example, the school-level variables may not pick up diﬀerences among subgroups of
graduates from a particular program. Also, Smeets et al. (2006) focus on graduates from many
schools in a short sample period while I use graduates of fewer schools over a longer horizon. If
hiring institutions improved their practices, the patterns Smeets et al. (2006) uncover may not
hold over the longer period. An alternative explanation is that Smeets et al. (2006) draw diﬀerent
conclusions because they use diﬀerent sector and rank variables than I do.
Yet another possible reconciliation of the results here with those in Smeets et al. (2006) could
be due to diﬀerences in “option value” when people graduate from PhD programs. If the top
students at each school are also the ones with the greatest variance in their performance, then
schools will ﬁnd them relatively attractive given they can deny tenure to those that turn out to
24be less productive. This would explain why top students at second-tier schools are on average less
productive and successful than second-tier students at top schools, but more sought after in the
initial job market. But, if this is true for top students at all schools or for only a very small fraction
of students overall, there would be no signiﬁcant diﬀerences by schools in how often their graduates
move “up” or “down” in job quality. Note that I found no correlation between variation in research
productivity and any characteristics that are observable in the dataset, though variability at the
time of leaving school could well vary in ways that hiring institutions can observe.
Overall, I interpret the results in Table 6 as providing suggestive evidence on three issues. First,
there are some curious diﬀerences in the patterns of movements of male and female economists early
in their career that merit further (and more careful) analysis. Second, there is some evidence that,
when demand for economists is strong, employers hi r ee i t h e rm o r ee c o n o m i s t s( o rl o w e r - q u a l i t y
economists) than they will need in steady state. These economists are more likely to move to lower
ranked employers in the ﬁrst ten years after leaving school. Third, there is no evidence to suggest
that the market systematically mis-values graduates of speciﬁc schools, NSF and Sloan fellowships,
or an economist’s country of origin. These conclusions are subject to the important qualiﬁcations
noted at the beginning of this section.
The second conclusion, which suggests that economists get “over-placed” in favorable macro-
economic markets, suggests that universities could beneﬁt by hiring counter-cyclically. That is, a
single institution might be able to get higher ability economists if it hired when others do not. This
would be a diﬃcult strategy to follow, as it would be hard to commit the institution to not hire
when resources are readily available. One potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be
to estimate the value of this hiring strategy for diﬀerent types of institutions that hire economists.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper, I have used careers of economists to conﬁrm several intuitively appealing ideas
about careers of high-skill workers. First, I showed that worker productivity and human-capital
development is aﬀected by the type of jobs they hold. Second, I showed evidence that suggests
employers learn about employees’ ability early in their careers and that this is related to where
those employees work as their careers develop. I also showed that, though employers do not make
perfect predictions about new graduates’ ability, there is no evidence that they make systematic
mistakes. They appear to appropriately value, for example, the signal of graduating from the most
prestigious graduate school.
There are at least four potentially fruitful avenues for future research based on the analysis
25here. First, either through a survey or some other data source, collecting information on wages
could yield further insights into the economist labor market. Second, I have had to qualify the
implications of this analysis due to the diﬃculty in separately identifying how productivity and
job placement are determined (and how they determine one another.) Structural modeling of the
underlying processes or identiﬁcation of credible instruments for endogenous variables would lead
to sharper conclusions about causality in the career development process and to a more complete
understanding of the underlying labor market.
Third, while I have shown that the average economist moves “down” in the ﬁrst ten years of her
career, I have said nothing about why this is the case. But this appears to be a broader empirical
regularity across professional labor markets, with lots of graduates of top schools starting at high
proﬁle employers (such as top law ﬁrms, top consulting ﬁrms, leading technology companies, etc.)
For example, consider Figure 3. It shows the cumulative distribution of job market entry (deﬁned,
somewhat less exactly than in the rest of this paper, as date received highest degree) of employees
at three types of institutions. The solid line is based on the departments of economics at three
leading research universities. The line that closely tracks the solid line is based on departments
of economics at universities where economists engage in research but where the department ranks
forty-second or lower. The dotted line is the distribution for a single large law ﬁrm (which appears to
be representative of large law ﬁrms.) The ﬁgure suggests three slightly diﬀerent experience proﬁles
within each of these three types of organizations. At the non-leading economics departments, the
distribution is nearly uniform. Among junior economists, some move down to lower ranked schools
and get replaced by people who drop down from top-ranked schools. At top schools, the distribution
is weighted a little more towards junior economists, many of whom will move down to lower-ranked
institutions for the bulk of their careers. But this law ﬁrm, which has an “up-or-out” system similar
to a university tenure system, is weighted even more heavily towards junior employees. For every
lawyer with twenty to twenty-ﬁve years of experience, there are about four with under ﬁve years
of experience. Why do law ﬁrms use such high leverage relative to economics departments? Is the
value of employer learning higher? Is the value of early career human capital development higher
(and more concentrated)? Is there a speciﬁcr e a s o nt os a m p l es o m et y p e so fj o b se a r l yi no n e ’ s
career (as suggested by Miller (1984) and MacDonald (1982))? Future research could model and
measure these environments to shed light on optimal organizational design at high-skill employers.
Finally, Section 4.4 presented evidence that suggests universities and other employers of econo-
mists can improve the average ability of their new hires if they hire counter-cyclically. That is,
competition for economist skill varies with macroeconomic trends. If a university hires when de-





























































Figure 3: Distribution of Labor Market Entry Dates. “Econ Research” includes the
departments of economics at Harvard, MIT, and Princeton in 2005-2006. “Econ Other” includes
the departments of economics at Rice, George Washington, Tulane, Emory, St. Louis, Middlebury,
and Boston College. “Law Firm” is based on lawyer proﬁles on the website of one of the world’s
ﬁve largest law ﬁrms, as of January, 2006.
that some already do it, more employers) employ this hiring strategy? One constraint may be the
diﬃculty of committing to not hiring when resources are available. Future research could, after
measuring or making assumptions about the value of increased research productivity, estimate the
cost of this inability to commit to a counter-cyclical strategy.
27References
Altonji, Joseph G. and Charles R. Pierret, “Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116, 313—350.
Carmichael, H. Lorne, “Incentives in Academics: Why is There Tenure?,” Journal of Political Economy,
1988, 96, 453—472.
Chen, Yonmin and Terra McKinnish, “Do Economics Departments Search Optimally in Faculty Re-
cruiting?,” Economic Inquiry, 2005, 43, 676—688.
Farber, Henry S., “Mobility and Stability: The Dynamics of Job Change in Labor Markets,” in Orley
Ashenfelter and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, New York: North-Holland,
1999.
and Robert Gibbons, “Learning and Wage Dynamics,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, 111,
1007—1047.
Gibbons, Robert, Lawrence F. Katz, Thomas Lemieux, and Daniel Parent, “Comparative Ad-
vantage, Learning, and Sectoral Wage Determination,” Journal of Labor Economics, 2005, 23, 681—723.
Jovanovic, Boyan, “Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,” Journal of Political Economy, 1979, 87,
972—990.
Kahn, Charles and Gur Huberman, “Two-sided Uncertainty and ´ SUp-or-OutŠ Contracts,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 1988, 6, 423—444.
Lazear, Edward P., “Hiring Risky Workers,” in Isao Ohashi and Toshiaki Tachibanaki, eds., Internal
Labour Markets, Incentives, and Employment, New York: St. MartinŠs Press, 1998.
MacDonald, Glenn M., “A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation
of Information,” American Economic Review, 1982, 72, 1038—1055.
Miller, Robert A., “Job Matching and Occupational Choice,” Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92,
1086—1120.
Oyer, Paul, “Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for Economists,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20, 143—160.
, “The Making of an Investment Banker: Macroeconomic Shocks, Career Choice, and Lifetime Income,”
Working Paper 12059, National Bureau of Economic Research 2006.
Smeets, Valerie, Frederic Warzynski, and Tom Coupe, “Does the Academic Labor Market Initially
Allocate New Graduates Eﬃciently?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20, 161—172.
28